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In this paper we contribute new results on the different consumers’ reaction to tax or price changes. 
We separately compute the compensated gasoline retail price elasticity and the gasoline tax elasticity 
and show that consumers overreact to taxes as compared to price variations. A novel element in our 
analysis is that we compare reactions to tax-inclusive retail prices to reactions to information on excise 
taxes that is made available to consumers. We estimate a complete system of demand for the U.S. 
population of households using quarterly data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey from 2007 to 
2009. Relying on a complete system of demands rather than on single equations avoids imposing an 
implausible separability restriction, thus allowing estimation of accurate elasticities that take 
behavioral responses into account, i.e. that account for the way in which consumers reallocate their 
expenditure on a bundle of goods after a price/tax change in one of the goods. Our analysis shows that 
the reaction to a gasoline tax change is, on average, about 20% stronger than the reaction to a 
corresponding price change. We discuss the implications of our findings for the design of energy 
policies. 
Keywords 
Gasoline taxation, tax salience, demand analysis 




This paper is concerned with different responses of U.S. consumers to changes in gasoline prices and 
gasoline taxes. Gasoline taxes in the U.S. raise more revenue than any other commodity tax both at 
state and federal levels. They also play an important role as corrective taxes, since gasoline use entails 
many negative externalities, notably CO2 emissions, air pollution and traffic congestion. Though 
Pigouvian taxes are widely recognized as the most effective tool to address negative externalities and 
to shape behavior, the fact that gasoline demand is inelastic to its price makes this tool rather 
ineffective as an incentive. At the same time, any price increase in presence of a rigid demand curve 
would disproportionately impact poor households, raising distributional issues.  
The idea that agents may respond differently to tax and price changes is central to a number of 
recent contributions (Chetty, 2009; Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009; Congdon et al., 2009; 
Goldin and Homonoff, 2013; Davis and Killian, 2011; Li et al., 2012; Rivers and Schaufele, 2012) 
questioning a central assumption in public finance according to which people respond to tax changes 
in the same way as they respond to price changes. These contributions vary in the taxed good domain 
and the methodological approach, but also in the explanation given for such difference.  
Davis and Killian (2011) and Li et al. (2012) consider different reactions to taxes and prices as 
consistent with rational behavior. Since tax changes are usually more long lasting and less volatile 
than price changes, consumers react to announcements of increasing commodity taxes by changing 
their expectations of future prices accordingly. Behavioral economics contributions, instead, focus on 
the visibility of taxes (salience, in psychological parlance) as the main reason for observing a different 
reaction. For example, Finkelstein (2009) shows that the demand curve for driving is more inelastic 
when tolls are charged electronically as compared to manual collection. Chetty et al. (2009) use both 
experimental evidence and choice data to demonstrate that making sales taxes visible increases 
demand responsiveness. The salience or prominence of taxes seems to be a major factor affecting 
consumers’ reactions. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) were probably the first to focus on the relevance 
of salience in consumers’ decision making. They identified several heuristics affecting individual 
decision-making and noticed that individuals often rely heavily on information that is readily available 
or prominent, ignoring information that they do not see or that is not readily available.  
Information availability is therefore crucial. Indeed “availability” is one of the judgemental 
heuristics mentioned by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). More importantly, they indicated salience as 
one of the crucial factors affecting the degree of “availability” of information useful to make sound 
decisions (Cfr. Op. Cit. p. 1127). Whether information is easily available or not is therefore crucial 
and the degree of salience of such information affects the degree of its availability. In the tax domain, 
there is one important distinction to be made, between information on taxes that is “available”, but not 
prominent or salient, and information on taxes that is not “available” and therefore invisible. Sales 
taxes are an example of the first type. Most consumers know about sales taxes, but they might not 
think about them when they make their purchasing decision. Information on sales taxes is available but 
not salient. Excise taxes are an example of the second type. Consumers may know they exist, but since 
such taxes are bundled with the posted price, they are in practice invisible to them and impossible to 
ferret out. Information on excise taxes is not readily available to consumers. Consumers may also be 
completely unaware of such taxes, because excise taxes are in fact much less salient than visible-but-
not-prominent taxes like sales taxes. Studies in behavioral public economics exploring the impact of 
tax salience have usually considered taxes included in the posted price, like excise taxes, as highly 
salient (Chetty et al. 2009; Goldin and Homonoff, 2013). In fact, gasoline excise tax information is 
invisible to most consumers. Therefore, in the present study we treat information on such taxes as 
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new, additional information that is made available to the consumers when making their purchase 
decisions.  
An additional explanation for the difference in consumers’ responses to taxes and prices, suggested 
by the economics and psychology literature, is that people may perceive an additional burden 
associated with tax payments compared to economically equivalent payments labeled differently, a 
phenomenon called Tax Aversion (McCaffery and Baron, 2006). Experimental evidence of Tax 
Aversion is growing (Kallbekken et al., 2010 and 2011; Blaufus and Möhlmann, 2012), but there is no 
empirical evidence of such framing effect usingchoice, rather than experimental, data.  
All of these explanations are not mutually exclusive, but what they have in common is the 
consistent result that consumers exhibit more elastic demand responses to tax than to price changes. 
Starting from this idea, empirical evidence has been accumulating (Davis and Killian, 2011; Li et 
al., 2012; Rivers and Schaufele, 2012) that consumers overreact to gasoline tax changes as compared 
to price changes. This suggests an interesting way in which Pigouvian taxes’ effectiveness, for 
example, could be increased. These contributions, however, rely on single-equation estimates of the 
price and tax elasticity of demand for gasoline. A major inconvenience of single-equation models is 
the imposition of implausible separability restrictions and, thus, their inability to estimate cross price 
effects between different energy goods. For this reason, single equations tend to produce elasticities 
that on average are lower (in absolute value) than those computed by estimating complete demand 
systems.  
In this paper, we compute gasoline tax and price elasticities by estimating a complete demand 
system, thus addressing this important methodological point. The main advantage of relying on 
demand analysis rather than on single equation estimates is that we can account for how each 
household reallocates its total current expenditure among a bundle of current consumption goods after 
a price change in one of them. Exploiting complementarities and substitution relationships among 
commodities implies larger, on average, own price elasticities compared to those obtained from single 
equations. In turn, this implies that estimates of the degree of under/overreaction to gasoline taxes are 
more accurate than those obtained from single equations. In general, for a given tax elasticity, the 
lower (the higher) the price elasticity in absolute value, the higher (the lower) the degree of 
overreaction. Single equations tend to produce lower price elasticities, thus biasing the degree of 
overreaction to taxes away from one.  
In fact, little previous work has been done on gasoline demand in the U.S. at the household level 
and using a complete system of demands consistent with duality theory (Nicol, 2003; Oladosu, 2003; 
West and Williams, 2004 and 2007), and even less has taken full account of households’ 
heterogeneity, i.e. of differences in household composition and location (Schmalensee and Stoker, 
1999, even though they do not employ a demand system nor a tightly parameterized model based on 
household utility). 
To estimate the differential response to taxes and prices, Li et al. (2012) and Rivers and Schaufele, 
(2012) decompose the retail price of gasoline into two components: a tax-exclusive price and a tax 
component. Davis and Killian (2011) instead estimate two gasoline demand equations. In the first they 
use the retail price (inclusive of all taxes) of gasoline as explanatory variable. In the second, they use 
taxes rather than prices. In this paper we instead consider retail prices (inclusive of all taxes) and 
excise taxes as distinct explanatory variables. Because excise taxes are bundled into the retail price 
they are usually invisible: consumers may know they exist, but in practice they are invisible and 
impossible to ferret out. Consumers may also be completely unaware of such taxes. By adding taxes to 
the set of explanatory variables we study the effect of making excise tax information readily available 
to the consumers, in the Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) sense. 
This paper adds to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we provide accurate measures 
of own and cross price elasticities for a bundle of energy related goods, including gasoline, estimating 
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a complete system of demand, thus accounting for the behavioral responses of the households. 
Information on gasoline taxes is treated as additional information that is made available to the 
consumers when making their purchasing decision. We find robust evidence that U.S. consumers 
overreact to excise tax changes compared to price changes. Our degree of overreaction is however 
smaller than previous estimates have found. This is likely to be due to the fact that elasticities from 
single equation estimates tend to be lower, inflating the degree of over (or under) reaction to taxes. 
Second, we compute the degree of overreaction to gasoline taxes accounting for a number of 
demographic variables that capture heterogeneity among U.S. households. Overreaction to taxes tends 
to be larger in the Northeast and Midwest regions of the country and for households owning zero or 
one car at most. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical 
specification. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 analyzes the estimation results and the measures of 
overreaction to tax changes relative to price changes. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Empirical Specification 
The functional form chosen to specify our model is the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
(QAIDS, Banks, Blundel and Lewbel, 1997) that generalizes the popular AIDS (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980) by adding a non-linear income term to the share equations. This demand system 
allows for flexible income and price responses and it does not have constant elasticities, as they 
depend on the level of expenditure. As reported by Labandeira et al. (2006), the interest of rank-three 
models, like the QAIDS, is particularly relevant in demand systems using data from the U.S. CEX or 
the Canadian FAMEX consumer expenditure surveys. We start from the indirect utility function 
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hh ddd ...= 1 . The demand functions (2) satisfy integrability, i.e. are consistent 
with utility maximization, when the following parametric restrictions hold: 
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for all ji,  (Symmetry). Compared to AIDS, this functional specification adds a quadratic term in the 
log of income, thus allowing for non linear changes in the budget shares following a price or income 
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The presence of zeros in the dependent variables is quite important for our sample. To deal with 
this problem we use the two-step estimator proposed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) which involves 
probit estimation in the first step and a selectivity-augmented equation system in the second step
2
. The 
system of equations (2) is thus estimated in the following form (we omit the subscript h to ease 
notation):  
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  (3) 
where is  is the observed expenditure share for good i; iz  is a vector of exogenous variables; i  is a 
parameter vector;   is a vector containing all parameters ( i , ik , ib , ig  and ijc ) in the demand 
system; )(= iii sEs   and where )(  and )(  are the standard normal probability density (pdf) 
and distribution (cdf) functions, respectively. The system of equations (3) is estimated in two-steps: (i) 
we obtain Maximum Likelihood (ML) probit estimates i̂  of i  using the binary outcome 0=is  and 
0>is ; (ii) we calculate )ˆ,(
'
iiz  , )ˆ(
'
iiz  for all i  and estimate n ,...,,, 21  in the augmented 
system (3) by ML. 
Such two-step estimator is consistent, but the error terms are heteroscedastic, thus the estimated 
elements of the second-step conventional covariance matrix are inefficient. For simplicity, we 
empirically calculate the standard errors of the elasticities using nonparametric bootstrapping and 
running 500 replications. The dependent variable in the first-step probit estimates is the binary 
outcome defined by the expenditure in each good. The predicted pdf and cdf from the six probit 
equations are included in the second step of the procedure (see Yen, Lin and Smallwood (2003), p. 
464). First-step Probit models were used for all commodities except Food, for which the number of 
zeroes is very low. Exogenous variables used in the first-step probit estimates are: disposable income 
proxied by total current expenditure, demographic and geographic dummies as described in the 
following section. In all estimates we impose homogeneity and symmetry. Economic theory also 
requires the matrix of Slutzky substitution effects to be negative semi-definite. Such a requirement is 
satisfied at the point of sample means and there is no need to impose it using the Cholesky 
decomposition. Finally, we drop the "other goods and services" equation to accommodate adding up. 
Differentiation of equation (3) gives demand elasticities for the first n-1 goods and elasticities for 
the n
th
 good are obtained exploiting the Cournot and Engel restrictions (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, 
p. 16). The corresponding uncompensated, compensated and expenditure elasticities for good i are, 
respectively: 
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1
 We ran a likelihood ratio test to test the hypothesis 
i =0. The test rejected the null hypothesis, thus we chose the QAID 
rather than AID specification. 
2
 Shonkwiler and Yen (1999); Yen, Lin and Smallwood (2003) and Yen and Lin (2006) provide useful literature review on 
estimation procedures for censored demand systems. 
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2.1 Incorporating Information on Taxes into Demand Functions 
To account for the effects of gasoline taxes on consumer behavior we include them among the 
explanatory variables of the share equations using the translating technique (Pollak and Wales, 1992), 
a special case of the modifying function technique proposed by Lewbel (1985) and often used to 
analyze the effect of non-price, non-income variables like information (Jensen et al., 1992; Chern et 
al., 1995), innovation (Moro et al., 1996), or advertising (Duffy, 1995; Brown and Lee, 1997), in 
demand systems. This technique consists of positing an additional set of linear, auxiliary relationships 
between the αi in the share equations (2) and the logarithmic values of the sum of federal and state 
taxes on gasoline. This model implies that the pattern of consumer demands will vary not only as 
incomes and prices change. Information on taxes may also induce changes in budget shares. The 
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3. Data 
3.1 Household budget shares, total expenditure and socio-demographics 
The U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) produced by the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) is 
the main data source for our application. We use micro-data of the quarterly Interview Survey (IS) 
from waves 2007, 2008 and 2009 of the CE.
3
 Each CE wave has five IS cross-sections: one per 
calendar quarter in which the interviews took place, including the first quarter of the following year.
4
 
We thus draw on 15 cross-sections and about 90,000 observations, as each cross-section has 
approximately 6,000 observations. The model, however, is estimated on a subset of 43,457 
observations, those for which the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is indicated. We use such a 
subset because more price variation is obtained with indices that vary by MSA than with State-level 
indices. The sample spans 39 months, from January 2007 to March 2010, and 20 MSA (see Tables A1 
and A2, in the Appendix).  
                                                     
3
 The CE consists of two components, a quarterly Interview Survey (IS) and a weekly Diary Survey, each with its own 
questionnaire and sample.  
4
 The IS is a panel rotation survey. Each panel is interviewed for five consecutive quarters and then dropped from the 
survey and replaced with a new one. About 20 percent of the addresses are new to the survey each month.  
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In the IS, each household’s expenditures, which refer to the three months before the interview, are 
classified into 60 consumption categories. Our system of demand only considers current expenditures 
(durables and occasional purchases are ignored), which correspond to 40 of the 60 categories. 
Specifically, the model is estimated for the following set of budget shares:  
1. Home food 
2. Electricity 
3. Natural gas 
4. Other home fuels 
5. Motor fuels (gasoline) 
6. Public transport 
7. All other expenditures 
where: Other home fuels is the sum of expenditures on fuel oil, non-piped gas and other fuels (heating 
fuels); Public transport is the sum of fares paid for all forms of public transport, including buses, taxis, 
coaches, trains, ferries and airlines. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics of these budget shares as they appear in the sample. On average, 
expenditure on food consumed or prepared at home accounts for 22.8% of total current expenditure, 
followed by motor fuels and electricity, which represent 9.1% and 5.8%, respectively; the residual 
category, All other expenditures, represents 56.7% of total current expenditure. The coefficients of 
variation indicate that variability is greatest for Other home fuels, Public transport and Natural gas, in 
that order. Large proportions of households reported zero expenditure for these categories (see the 
shares in the last column of the Table). Consumption of the respective goods or services is conditional 
on certain prerequisites, such as the possession of specific appliances and high substitutability between 
private and public transport, which may not be there for many households. 
Table 1 – Summary statistics of budget shares 





Min Max Zeros 
 Food at home 43,457 22.8% 13.7% 0.60 0.0% 100.0% 0.9% 
 Electricity 43,457 5.8% 5.3% 0.92 0.0% 100.0% 8.5% 
 Natural gas 43,457 2.9% 4.3% 1.50 0.0% 63.4% 38.5% 
 Other home fuels 43,457 0.7% 3.1% 4.59 0.0% 72.8% 91.2% 
 Motor fuels 43,457 9.1% 7.7% 0.84 0.0% 100.0% 12.9% 
 Public transport 43,457 2.0% 5.4% 2.63 0.0% 81.4% 73.4% 








Different types of socio-demographic characteristics are also extracted from the IS dataset. Descriptive 
statistics of those and total current expenditure are reported in Table 2. The household profile is 
categorised through 6 dummy variables identifying the following types: a) Single; b) Husband and 
wife; c) Husband and wife, with oldest child under 6 (years old); d) Husband and wife, with oldest 
child under 18; e) Husband and wife, with oldest child over 17; f) Other households. Geographic 
location is rendered through four dummy variables, one for each of the Census-defined regions: 
Northeast, Midwest, South and West. A dummy variable brings in information on the composition of 
earners in the household: it takes the value 1 if both reference person and spouse are income earners; 
0, otherwise. A categorical variable classifies the education level of the reference person in 9 levels. 
Finally, the model controls for the number of cars owned by the household. 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics of socio-demographics and total current expenditure 




 Single 43,457 0.28 0.45 0 1 
 H&W 43,457 0.19 0.40 0 1 
 H&W, child(ren) <6 43,457 0.05 0.21 0 1 
 H&W, child(ren)<18 43,457 0.14 0.34 0 1 
 H&W,child(ren) >17 43,457 0.08 0.27 0 1 
 Other households 43,457 0.26 0.44 0 1 
 Northeast 43,457 0.31 0.46 0 1 
 Midwest 43,457 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 South 43,457 0.24 0.43 0 1 
 West 43,457 0.26 0.44 0 1 
 Composition income earners 43,457 0.23 0.42 0 1 
 Education reference person* 43,457 13.41 1.98 0 17 
 Number of cars 43,457 0.91 0.89 0 15 
 Total current expenditure, $ 43,457 7,178.8 7,298.6 35.0 321,316.0 
* 0 “Never attended school”, 10 “1st through 8th grade”, 11 “9th through 12th grade”, 12 “High school graduate”, 13 “Some 
college, less than college graduate”, 14 “Associate’s degree”, 15 “Bachelor’s degree”, 16 “Master’s degree”, 17 
“Professional/Doctorate degree". 
3.2 Price indices and gasoline taxes 
Insufficient price variation is a common problem when estimating demand models with cross-sectional 
data and price indices. We avoid this issue by using monthly indices varying by MSA, which exhibit 
sufficient time and spatial variation.
5
 Another potential problem is some degree of inaccuracy in the 
correspondence between demand and price data. In our application, this issue does not arise because 
price indices, also produced by BLS, follow the same classification of household expenditure. BLS 
uses the CE to periodically revise the expenditure weights of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). There 
is, therefore, perfect correspondence between IS and CPI statistics with respect to the expenditure 
aggregates. In the Appendix, Table A3 shows summary statistics of price indices; also, Figure A1 
shows the evolution over time of price indices averaged by region. 
In the U.S., three layers of taxes apply to consumption of gasoline and auto diesel, namely, federal 
taxes, State taxes and local taxes. The federal tax rate on gasoline is 18.4 cents per gallon and has not 
changed since 2006.
6
 By contrast, State taxes can differ significantly from one State to another and 
they are occasionally subject to revisions. The data we use on monthly rates of State taxes are 
published by the Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA).
7
 Local taxes are not considered due to lack 
of information. Figure A2, in the Appendix, shows the frequency distribution of State tax rates in our 
sample. 
                                                     
5
 Only, as price indices by MSA are not available for Other home fuels nor for Public transport, U.S. level indices are 
considered in these cases. 
6
 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
7
 Two rates are added up: “State motor gasoline taxes” and “Other State taxes”, in FTA’s nomenclature.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Coefficients and elasticities 
Table 3 reports some of the estimated parameters of the two-stage QAID model, in (3).
8
 In 
commenting on those, we focus on the equation for the gasoline budget share. All the geographic 
dummies (αNE, αSO, αWE) are statistically significant and their values indicate that, relative to the 
Midwest (the base category), living in the West has a positive impact on gasoline consumption, 
followed by the South and the Northeast (in decreasing order). As expected, the number of cars owned 
by a household (αNCAR) has a positive impact on gasoline consumption. The same is also true for the 
presence of two income earners in the household (αTWOE), possibly due to longer cumulative distances 
to reach the workplaces. Conversely, a higher education level of the head of household (αEDUC) turns 
out to have a negative impact on gasoline consumption. In addition, the quadratic term of total 
expenditure (λ) is statistically significant in all the equations, which proves that the QAID model fits 
the data better than the AID model could do. 
Concerning the elasticities, compensated own-and cross-price elasticities, along with expenditure 
elasticities and estimated budget shares, are shown in Table 4. All of these are evaluated at the sample 
means of exogenous variables. On average, 18.4% of total current outlay is spent on energy related 
products (the sum of the budget shares of Electricity, Natural gas, Other home fuels and Gasoline), 
with Gasoline on its own making up about 9% of total current expenditure. With regard to expenditure 
elasticities, Home food, Natural gas and Gasoline turn out to be necessities,
9
 while the remaining 
goods and services appear to be luxuries to different degrees.
10
 All own-price elasticities are generally 
plausible, ranging between -0.855 and -0.293, for Electricity and Natural gas, respectively.
11
 For 
Gasoline, we find an own-price elasticity of -0.50, which is in line with the U.S. literature estimating 
complete systems of demand (e.g., West and Williams [2007], West and Williams [2004], Nicol 
[2003], Oladosu [2003]). Indeed, we observed that single equation studies tend to find lower price 
elasticities (in absolute value). We reckon that this has probably to do with both differences in model 
specification and nature of the data, as typically – not always – demand systems and single demand 
equations are estimated with cross-sectional data and time-series data, respectively. To back this 
hypothesis, we report, in Table 5, some recent estimates of own-price elasticities of U.S. household 
demand for gasoline, distinguishing between demand systems and single equation models. 
  
                                                     
8
 Price coefficients and c.d.f. coefficients are not reported to save space. These parameters, as well as first-step probit 
coefficients, are available from the authors upon request. 
9
 The expenditure elasticities for Home food, Natural gas and Public transport are close to those derived by Labandeira et 
al. (2006), in a similar application with Spanish data. 
10
 Perhaps, expenditure elasticities greater than 1 both for Electricity and Public transport are unexpected. The reason may 
lie in the specific nature of the data: Electricity includes expenditures for second, third and n-th homes; similarly, Public 
transport includes air travelling. 
11
 Alberini et al. (2011) estimate price and income elasticities of U.S. household demand both for electricity and gas. For 
electricity, own-price elasticities range between -0.860 and -0.667; for gas, between -0.693 and -0.566. 
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Table 3 - Second-step QAID estimates  
 
  i=1  i=2  i=3  i=4  i=5  i=6 
Coefficient Food Electricity Nat. Gas Oth. F. Gasoline Pb. Tr. 
αi
 
0.200 0.054 0.036 0.647 0.106 0.119 
 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.031 0.002 0.025 
βi
 
-0.109 -0.029 -0.019 -0.044 -0.039 0.032 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 
λi
 
-0.003 0.001 -0.004 -0.041 -0.013 -0.007 
 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 
αi,NE
 
0.030 0.012 -0.006 -0.083 0.009 -0.033 
 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.015 0.001 0.005 
αi,SO
 
0.017 0.039 -0.027 -0.021 0.013 0.012 
 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.004 
αi,WE
 
0.041 -0.005 -0.038 -0.002 0.018 -0.013 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.004 
αi,NCAR
 
-0.011 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.011 -0.007 
 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
αi,TWOE
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.021 0.011 0.002 
 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
αi,N1
 
-0.056 -0.009 0.001 0.107 0.003 -0.030 
 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.005 
αi,N3
 
0.028 -0.001 -0.002 0.035 0.011 -0.014 
 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.004 
αi,N4
 
0.053 0.007 0.001 0.024 0.018 0.002 













αi,N6 0.024 0.003 0.001 0.039 0.016 -0.026 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 
αi,EDUC -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
LogLikelihood 392.200      
R2 0.34 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.04 
N obs 43,256      
Note: Standard Errors in Italics below coefficients. Bold entries correspond to rejection of 0=:0 eH  at the 
5%significance level for a two tailed test. 
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Table 4 - Estimated Budget Shares, Expenditure and Compensated Elasticities  

















 Food  Electricity  Nat. Gas Oth. Fuels  Gasoline  Public 
Transport 
Other Goods  
               
wj
 
 0.228   0.058   0.029  0.007  0.090   0.021   0.567  
               
ej
 
 0.871  1.260  0.712 2.882  0.405   1.389   1.098  
  0.021  0.033  0.060 0.151 0.032  0.117   0.010  
e
C
1j -0.852 -0.051 0.101 0.005 -0.021 0.497 0.648 
 0.039 0.013 0.013 0.025 0.018 0.034 0.050 
e
C
2j -0.075 -0.855 -0.024 0.066 -0.150 -0.056 1.801 
 0.047 0.028 0.023 0.042 0.029 0.071 0.080 
e
C
3j 0.515 -0.047 -0.293 0.384 -0.297 0.599 -0.848 
 0.067 0.032 0.043 0.063 0.040 0.096 0.107 
e
C
4j -0.196 -0.017 0.192 -0.768 0.021 0.495 2.267 
 0.091 0.038 0.043 -0.384 -0.253 0.154 1.585 
e
C
5j -0.179 -0.152 -0.155 -0.003 -0.496 -0.050 0.719 
 -0.041 0.018 0.019 0.039 0.029 0.047 0.067 
e
C
6j 1.551 -0.033 0.366 0.388 -0.004 -0.796 -1.150 
 0.110 0.057 0.057 0.130 0.062 0.215 0.197 
e
C
7j 0.299 0.136 -0.014 -0.032 0.118 -0.194 -0.396 
 0.018 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.011 
               
               
Note: Standard Errors in Italics below coefficients. Bold entries correspond to rejection of 0=:0 eH  at the 5% 
significance level for a two tailed test. 
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Table 5 – Estimates of price elasticities of U.S. household demand for gasoline 
Systems of demand 
Study Own price elasticity of gasoline demand 
  
West and Williams (2007) -0.75; -0.27 (range) 
West and Williams (2004) -0.46 
Nicol (2003) -0.598; -0.026 (range) 
Oladosu (2003) -0.70; -0.36 (range) 
 
Single equations 
Study Own price elasticity of gasoline demand 
Li et al. (2012) -0.39 
Sentenac-Chemin (2012) -0.30 
Su (2011) -0.397 
Davis and Kilian (2011) -0.46 
Manzan and Zerom (2010) -0.35 
Hughes et al. (2008) -0.077 
Small and Van Dender (2007) -0.43 
Cross-price elasticities measure the degree of substitution or complementarity between the goods 
considered. Each entry of Table 4 shows the percentage change in the quantity demanded of the goods 
listed in the rows following a 1% change in the price of the goods listed in the columns. For Gasoline, 
relationships of complementarity arise with Natural gas and Electricity. In both cases, the relationship 




ji have the same sign (e
C
35 = -0.297 and e
C
53 = -0.155; e
C
25 = -0.150 
and e
C
52 = -0.152). While a theoretical explanation for these complementarities is not immediately 
obvious, it is good news for environmental policy that an increase in the price of Gasoline would also 
induce lower consumption of Natural gas and Electricity. Surprisingly, perhaps, the same is not true 
for Gasoline and Public transport, as both the cross-price elasticities relating the two are not 
statistically different from zero. Similarly, no price relationship emerges between Electricity and 
Natural gas. 
4.2 Overreaction to Gasoline Taxes 
 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the different responses of consumers to changes in gasoline 
taxes and gasoline prices. To do that, as in Rosen (1976) and Chetty et al. (2009), we compare the tax 
elasticity of Gasoline,   , and the compensated (tax inclusive) price elasticity of Gasoline,    
 . The 
ratio of these elasticities,  , measures the degree of overreaction, or underreaction, to gasoline taxes 
relative to the responsiveness to changes in gasoline prices:   
  
   
  . 
Under the alternative hypothesis of different demand responses to price and tax variations,   must 
be different from 1. We thus computed   at sample mean values, first for the whole sample and, then, 
for different macro-regions and different numbers of cars owned by households. For the whole sample, 
  turns out to be equal to 1.199. This means that, on average, households overreact to taxes and, 
specifically, their reaction to gasoline taxes is 20% larger than their reaction to price changes.
12
 
The existing literature offers a number of explanations for this differential response. Some of these 
explanations consider a different reaction to taxes as rational behavior consistent with full 
optimization. For example, Davis and Killian (2011) and Li et al. (2012) also find a larger response to 
taxes relative to prices in the gasoline market. One explanation they provide is that consumers can 
                                                     
12
 In all estimates, we checked that   is significantly different from one. At the sample mean,           (     ). 
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications 
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consider a change in taxes as more persistent than a change in prices and rationally adjust their 
expectations and consumption behavior accordingly. Other, behavioral economics explanations, 
consider the differential responses to taxes as the result of a number of (not mutually exclusive) 
cognitive biases affecting individual decision making. First, Gasoline tax changes may be more salient 
than price changes because they attract larger media coverage. As a result, consumers are more 
responsive to more salient price or tax changes. Second, people may perceive an additional burden 
associated with tax payments compared to economically equivalent payments labeled differently, a 
phenomenon called tax aversion (McCaffery and Baron, 2006; Kallbekken et al., 2010 and 2011; 
Blaufus and Möhlmann, 2012). These explanations are not mutually exclusive.  
What distinguishes this paper from previous contributions is that we compare reactions to retail 
prices to reactions to separate information on excise taxes. In doing that we assume that excise taxes 
included in the posted price are completely invisible. Because excise taxes are bundled into the 
advertised price, they are actually completely hidden, asconsumers cannot separate the excise tax 
component from the production price component. Excise taxes on various commodities are often 
largely unknown and very low salient. In order to analyze how consumers react to variations in excise 
taxes we treat information on excise taxes as new, separate information that is made available to the 
consumers and is therefore highly salient. 
That consumers react more to tax than to price changes is also confirmed when we compute the tax 
overreaction parameter,  , by some relevant demographic variable. Figure 1 contrasts estimated tax 
(ET) and price (EP) elasticities for Gasoline, by macro-region. The Northeast exhibits both the lowest 
price elasticity and the highest tax elasticity across the regions.
13
 The sum of these two results explains 
why   is significantly higher in that region as compared to the others, as Figure 2 shows. For the 
Northeast, the parameter of overreaction to gasoline taxes reaches as much as 1.479, which is 20% to 
30% higher than for the other regions. In fact, we find that   is not statistically different from 1, both 
for the South and the West. That is, for those regions, there is no evidence (at mean values) of 
overreaction, or underreaction, to tax changes. 
 
 
                                                     
13
 The sample mean of gasoline taxes for the Northeast is 7% to 14% higher than the same statistics for the other regions. 
Thus, this suggests that the higher tax elasticity might be related to the higher level of taxation. We will test the potential 










Northeast Midwest South West
Figure 1: ET and EP, by region 
ET
EP
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Figure 3 contrasts estimated tax and price elasticities of gasoline demand, this time by the number of 
cars in the household. The corresponding estimates of   are then pictured in Figure 4. Households 
with one car overreact to tax changes by about 15%, compared to equivalent price changes. 
Households with no cars overreact to tax changes by about 27%. In general, the degree of overreaction 
appears to be negatively related to the number of cars: the more the cars owned by the household, the 
lower the degree of overreaction to tax changes relative to price changes. In fact,   is not statistically 
different from 1 (at mean values) if more than one car is owned by the household. A possible 
explanation for this finding is the following. In presence of a direct relationship between income level 
and number of cars, the degree of attention to taxes could be inversely related to the level of income. 
That is, low income households having no car or one car at most, may be more sensitive to tax 
changes (relative to price changes) than richer households are. This argument is supported by recent 
findings of Goldin and Homonoff (2013), which show that low income consumers are more attentive 
to tax changes than high income consumers are.
14
 To investigate this possibility, we computed   at 
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 In particular low-income consumers are likely to be especially attentive to taxes on goods that represent a larger budget 
share compared to high income consumers. Gasoline is an excellent example of necessary commodities of this type. 
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Figure 3: ET and EP, by  number of cars 
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Our degree of overreaction to Gasoline taxes compares to the existing literature in the following ways. 
Li et al. (2012) estimate a single equation for Gasoline consumption and their   = 2.107.15 Davis and 
Killian (2011) also use a single equation approach to gasoline demand. We use their tax and price 
elasticity in Table 7 (AIC lag order, last column) to compute   = 2.143. Our degree of overreaction is 
much smaller in magnitude (around 1.200 at the sample mean). As we explain in the introduction, the 
use of single equation approaches implies the imposition of a separability assumption and, as a result, 
price elasticities may be biased downwards because they do not account for the possibilities of 
substitution among consumption goods. If this is the case, price elasticities from single equation 
estimates would inflate the denominator of θ. This is an important point. Since the different reaction to 
tax and price changes provides important information for the design of tax policies, accurate estimates 
of gasoline elasticities are necessary in order to predict consumers reactions in a precise way. 
5. Discussion 
This paper adds empirical evidence to the growing literature observing that people respond differently 
to tax and price changes. We offer a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, we 
compute own and cross price Gasoline elasticities by estimating a complete system of demand. This 
avoids imposing implausible separability restrictions among commodities demands and allows to 
compute elasticities that take behavioral responses into account. Obtaining accurate elasticity 
measures is crucial, because the indiscriminate use of Gasoline elasticities may generate inaccurate 
forecasts. Second, the ratio of the Gasoline tax elasticity and the compensated Gasoline price elasticity 
is computed for a number of demographic variables accounting for households heterogeneity in the 
U.S.. We consistently find that households overreact to Gasoline taxes as compared to Gasoline prices 
(by 20% at the sample mean). Finally, rather than comparing reactions to tax-exclusive price and to 
taxes, we compare reactions to tax-inclusive prices and to separate information on excise taxes that is 
made available to consumers. Current excise taxes on Gasoline in the U.S. are clearly low salient and 
less prominent than separate information on those same taxes. Consumers may be completely unaware 
of excise taxes that are bundled into the advertised price and that may be difficult to disentangle. 
Gasoline prices are an excellent example of this. They are probably the most salient among 
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 We consider estimated coefficients in Table 7, column 4 of the Li et al. (2012) paper. Since their Gasoline equation 
specification is log-log form, the elasticities ratio is simply given by the ratio of the coefficients -0.769 and -0.365 and the 














Figure 4: Theta, by number of cars 
Theta
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commodity prices. Consumers pay exactly the price they see on big signs at the pumps, but they are 
unable to separate the market price and excise tax components. In this paper we compare reactions to 
retail price changes and reactions to information on excise taxes that is made available to the 
consumers. This approach is close in spirit to Tversky and Kahneman’s idea of salience as one of the 
crucial factors affecting the degree of “availability” of information useful to make sound decisions. 
Our findings have relevant implications for the design of efficient taxes, because they confirm that 
salience manipulation can influence consumers responsiveness to price incentives. The recent and 
emerging literature on tax salience suggests that the degree to which taxes are salient is a choice 
variable for policy makers. When policy makers choose to keep some taxes hidden, or not prominent, 
this will contribute to keep consumers reaction low. This has obvious implications for the carbon tax 
debate in the U.S.. There is now near unanimity among U.S. economists spanning the political and 
academic spectrum (Hsu, 2009) in recognizing carbon taxes as the most efficient means of reducing 
large-scale pollution problems. Yet public support for fiscal efficiency-enhancing policies remains 
fragile. Our results suggests that the carbon tax rate that would reduce greenhouse gases emissions to 
any targeted level could be set lower than predicted by the current literature, if consumers’ reactions to 
carbon taxes can be increased by increasing their visibility
16
. A lower carbon tax rate would, in turn, 
probably be perceived as more acceptable than a correspondingly higher tax rate. By contrast, 
designing Pigouvian taxes as low salient excise taxes is inappropriate not only because they are 
intended to affect behavior and thus should be prominent, but also because they should be set at a 
higher rate which would make them less acceptable. 
There is usually a tradeoff between the effectiveness and the acceptability of policies. Because 
policies that are effective in changing behavior, such as price incentives, also tend to have greater 
impacts on consumers, they also usually receive less public support, and therefore are less politically 
palatable, producing a negative relationship between effectiveness and acceptability of such policy 
measures. Manipulating tax salience, by manipulating information availability, can change this 
tradeoff. Making excise taxes information visible can increase consumers’ reaction to them and shift 
the effectiveness-acceptability tradeoff upwards so that a higher level of effectiveness is associated 
with a given level of acceptability.  
                                                     
16
 One easy way to increase Gasoline tax salience by making information on taxes readily available is to design the posted 
price, on big signs at the pumps, as Price per gallon = $(price) + $(taxes) = $, rather than Price per gallon = $, in exactly 
the same way as Chetty et al. (2009) do in their exhibit 1. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Distribution of observations across time (year and month of the interview) 
 Year  
Month 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
 January 989 1,878 1,906 1,019 5,792 
 February 936 1,898 1,916 1,016 5,766 
 March 1,004 1,914 1,924 1,034 5,876 
 April 969 951 979 0 2,899 
 May 948 951 962 0 2,861 
 June 972 957 1,002 0 2,931 
 July 960 941 980 0 2,881 
 August 921 928 989 0 2,838 
 September 950 937 1,023 0 2,910 
 October 978 912 1,036 0 2,926 
 November 963 949 986 0 2,898 
 December 931 933 1,015 0 2,879 
 Total 11,521 14,149 14,718 3,069 43,457 
Note: The first three months of 2008 and 2009 have twice as many observations as the others because subsequent CE waves 
overlap in correspondence of the first calendar quarter, which is covered by two IS cross-sections. 
Table A2 – Distribution of observations across MSA 
Metropolitan Statistical Area State(s) Frequency Percent 
 Philadelphia – Wilmington – Atlantic City  PA – NJ – DE – MD 2,680 6.17% 
 Boston – Brockton – Nashua   MA – NH – ME – CT  2,472 5.69% 
 New York  NY 2,984 6.87% 
 New York, Connecticut suburbs  NY – CT 2,969 6.83% 
 New Jersey suburbs  NJ 2,474 5.69% 
 Chicago – Gary – Kenosha  IL – IN – WI 4,039 9.29% 
 Detroit – Ann Arbor – Flint  MI 2,264 5.21% 
 Cleveland – Akron  OH 1,058 2.43% 
 Minneapolis – St. Paul  MN – WI 1,368 3.15% 
 Washington  DC – MD – VA – WV 2,105 4.84% 
 Baltimore  MD 1,062 2.44% 
 Dallas – Ft. Worth  TX 2,038 4.69% 
 Houston – Galveston – Brazoria  TX 1,676 3.86% 
 Atlanta  GA 1,782 4.10% 
 Miami – Ft. Lauderdale  FL 1,398 3.22% 
 Los Angeles – Orange  CA 4,157 9.57% 
 Los Angeles suburbs  CA 1,388 3.19% 
 San Francisco – Oakland – San Jose  CA 2,708 6.23% 
 Seattle – Tacoma – Bremerton  WA 1,622 3.73% 
 San Diego  CA 1,213 2.79% 
 Total  43,457 100.00% 
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Table A3 – Price indices (1982-84 = 100) 
Index Obs.(#) Mean St. deviation Min Max 
 Food at home 43,457 208.40 24.61 124.23 236.79 
 Electricity 43,457 195.16 42.81 102.03 311.82 
 Natural gas 43,457 214.95 38.67 112.18 371.55 
 Other home fuels 43,457 273.30 44.96 228.03 384.30 
 Motor fuels 43,457 233.48 49.92 143.60 453.11 
 Public transport 43,457 237.77 10.85 219.86 267.72 
 All other expenditures 43,457 177.12 17.11 123.00 222.55 
Note: All indices are Laspeyres price indices, for all urban consumers, not seasonally adjusted. 
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